Inspect every supplied certificate signature link

Start with the supplied connection question

A user with a root, signing, subordinate and server hierarchy wanted to check every link after bundle order appeared to change a result. T314 makes each supplied-key candidate visible instead of presenting one undifferentiated pass. It solves the bounded connection and ordering task; it does not reproduce a trusted OpenSSL validation result.

Select 1–20 certificate-only UTF-8 PEM originals. Optional leading UTF-8 BOM and PEM whitespace are accepted. Do not include private keys, CMS bags or descriptive text outside the blocks. The input files are read locally; certificate URLs and unknown extension bytes remain inert data.

• Keep the original files for provenance. Reports retain original name, size and SHA256.
• Every original certificate is parsed and counted before byte-identical certificate duplicates collapse.

Know exactly which candidates are tested

A candidate exists only when original issuer and subject DER bytes are equal. Each candidate is actually verified with RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 and SHA256, including self-signatures and false candidates. An equal-looking Name encoded differently is not silently declared equivalent.

The first profile supports strict X.509 v3 DER, 2048–8192-bit odd RSA moduli and odd exponents 3–4294967295, canonical NULL algorithm parameters, exact UTC/Generalized times, and four stated Name string types. Unknown algorithms, Name types, unique IDs or malformed encodings reject the complete input. A structurally supported certificate with a bad signature remains in the complete report with a false edge.

Check the complete example

The controlled input contains five blocks: a leaf, root, intermediate, repeated root and a second same-Name intermediate with a different public key. All five originals consume 207 DER-node visits. Four unique certificates produce five real signature candidates. The wrong-key leaf candidate is false; the other four candidates are true.

The only leaf path is [0,2,1]. The ordered download preserves the DER bytes of that leaf, intermediate and supplied self-signed endpoint. The 80-bit leaf serial 1208925819614629174706181 remains an exact decimal string. A same-key second parent instead creates ambiguity; an actual cross-signed cycle is retained as a cycle and cannot produce an invented order.

Download the entire audit trail

certificate-links.json retains every original/duplicate mapping, raw DER, all Name attributes, declared dates, exact serials, extensions, ASN.1 spans/inventory and true/false candidate edges. Unknown critical extensions are retained as explicitly unvalidated bytes. certificates.csv includes every unique certificate; signature-links.csv includes every candidate. Only a permitted path adds ordered-supplied-certificates.pem.

CSV applies formula protection to any formula-leading cell, while exact literal values remain in JSON. The table shows all unique certificates, with 2,000 UTF-16 units per cell; copied text is a labelled summary. Use downloads to inspect complete long fields and all edges, rather than treating the preview as the report.

• Declared notBefore/notAfter are recorded, without checking the current clock.
• The supplied endpoint is included for evidence and is not promoted to a trusted anchor.

Apply simultaneous limits and recover

Original files and certificate work are charged before deduplication. A well-formed input can still produce an oversized complete report; that run refuses all output. The actual native proofs cover all independently reachable ceilings and first excesses, a real 10 MiB output, and cancelled signature work restored from the same originals. Native proofs do not replace browser interaction acceptance.

Each ≤ 2 MiB is implied by the combined ≤ 2 MiB bound. At most 100 unique certificates implies at most 10,000 ordered candidate pairs: 10,000 is reachable, and a 101st original is refused before a larger allocation. Supported schema depth is at most 6. Nested constructed depth 64 outside that profile is structurally scanned then refused; depth 65 hits a protective guard. Neither is a supported-certificate capacity promise.